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Abstract 
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The design of fund management compensation schemes has elicited interest amongst both prac-
titioners and researchers. The focus of the academic literature has been on how incentives a⁄ect
performance and risk-taking behavior of managers. A number of theoretical papers have studied
the e⁄ect of a performance-related incentive fee on managers￿incentive to search for private in-
formation (see, for example, Bhattacharya and P￿ eiderer (1985), Stoughton (1993), Heinkel and
Stoughton (1994) and G￿mez and Sharma (2006)). Another strand of literature addresses issues
related to the design of incentive fee. Adamati and P￿ eiderer (1997) and Dybvig, Farnsworth
and Carpenter (2001), among others, have discussed the convenience of absolute versus relative
(benchmarked to a given portfolio) incentive fees.1
With respect to risk, Roll (1992) was the ￿rst to illustrate the undesirable e⁄ect of relative
(i.e., benchmarked) portfolio optimization in a partial equilibrium, single-period model. In par-
ticular, he shows that the active portfolio has systematically higher risk than the benchmark.
Despite this adverse risk incentive, relative performance evaluation measures such as the In-
formation Ratio have become standard in the industry. In a static framework, several papers
have studied how di⁄erent constraints on the portfolio￿ s total risk (Roll (1992)), tracking error
(Jorion (2003)), and Value-at-Risk (VaR) (Alexander and Baptista (2006)), may help to reduce
excessive risk taking. In a dynamic setting, Basak, Shapiro, and Tepla (2006) study the optimal
policies of an agent subject to a benchmarking restriction. Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro (2006)
analyze the e⁄ect of an exogenous benchmark restriction on the manager￿ s risk-taking behavior.
Their model shows that an exogenous benchmark restriction may ameliorate the adverse risk
incentives induced by the manager￿ s compensation. Brennan (1993), Cuoco and Kaniel (1993)
and G￿mez and Zapatero (2003) study the asset pricing implication of relative incentive fees.
The extant literature discussed above investigates the issue of fund manager compensation
in a setting where the manager is unrestricted in her portfolio choice (for an interesting excep-
tion see G￿mez and Sharma (2006)). However, in practice, fund managers face various portfolio
constraints. For example, Almazan, Brown, Carlson and Chapman (2004) document that ap-
proximately 70% of mutual funds explicitly state (in Form N-SAR submitted to the SEC) that
short-selling is not permitted. This ￿gure rises to above 90% when the restriction is on margin
purchases. Surprisingly, given the widespread existence of constraints, the literature has not
addressed the implication of such constraints on fund manager￿ s incentives.2
This paper￿ s contribution is to incorporate exogenous portfolio constraints into the analysis
of linear incentive fees for e⁄ort inducement. This allows us to focus on how the provision of
incentives to induce manager￿ s e⁄ort are a⁄ected by the interaction between the benchmark
composition and the manager￿ s incentive fee. In our model, the manager￿ s incentives are ex-
1A further line of discussion concerns whether, if benchmarked, the incentive fee should be ￿convex￿ (i.e.
asymmetric), implying that the manager only participates in the upside and su⁄ers no penalty for underperforming
the benchmark, or, as prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for mutual funds, a ￿fulcrum￿
(symmetric) type of fee. See, for example, Das and Sundaram (2002) and Ou-Yang (2003).
2Portfolio constraints have been discussed in the literature in other contexts. For example, AlmazÆn et al.
(2004) present evidence that portfolio constraints are devices to monitor the manager￿ s e⁄ort. Grinblatt and
Titman (1989) and Brown et al. (1996) argue that cross-sectional di⁄erences in constraint adoption might be
related to characteristics that proxy for managerial risk aversion.
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two-period, two-asset (the market and a risk-less bond) model. The manager is o⁄ered a com-
pensation package that includes a ￿ at fee and a performance-tied incentive fee, possibly bench-
marked to a given portfolio return. Both the incentive fee and the benchmark composition are
determined endogenously.
A number of new insights arise after introducing portfolio constraints. First, in the absence of
moral hazard between the investor and the fund manager, the optimal incentive fee coincides with
the Pareto-e¢ cient risk allocation fee. In addition, we show that benchmarking the manager￿ s
incentive fee a⁄ects her timing ability, i.e., her ability to beat the benchmark. This new result
contrasts with the extant literature (Roll (1992) and Admati and P￿ eiderer (1997)) and shows
that if there exist constraints then benchmarking is optimal, even without moral hazard. We
derive explicitly the optimal benchmark￿ s composition as a function of the market moments, the
portfolio constraints, and the manager￿ s risk-aversion coe¢ cient. The benchmark is shown to
be independent of the manager￿ s disutility of e⁄ort. In the limit, when the portfolio constraints
vanish, the well-known ￿irrelevance result￿in Admati and P￿ eiderer (1997) arises: the manager￿ s
e⁄ort is independent of the benchmark composition; it only depends on the manager￿ s e⁄ort
disutility.
The second insight is that in presence of moral hazard and portfolio constraints, the observed
incentive fee contract under no moral hazard becomes optimal only in the limit, when the
manager risk aversion grows to in￿nity. In the case of moral hazard and ￿nite risk aversion,
numerical results show that the optimal incentive fee is higher than in the no moral hazard case.
However, the optimal benchmark in this case is less risky than in the absence of moral hazard
although, contrary to the unconstrained case in Ou-Yang (2003), it is di⁄erent from the risk-free
asset. This result is driven by the fact that, unlike in the unconstrained setting of Stoughton
(1993), under portfolio constraints a higher incentive fee does induce the manager to exert more
e⁄ort. This is shown to be consistent with the results in G￿mez and Sharma (2006).
To understand the model￿ s intuition, let￿ s look ￿rst at the manager￿ s e⁄ort and portfolio
choice problem in isolation. Consider a manager who is totally constrained in her ability to sell
short and purchase at margin. Under moral hazard, the manager￿ s optimal portfolio can be
decomposed in two components: her unconditional risk-diversi￿cation portfolio plus her timing
portfolio. The timing portfolio depends on the manager￿ s costly e⁄ort to improve her timing
ability through superior information. For a uninformed manager, this portfolio would be zero.
For a hypothetical perfectly informed manager, it would push the optimal total portfolio to
either boundary: 100% in the risky asset if the market risk premium is forecasted to be positive;
100% in the bond otherwise. Now, assume that the unconditional portfolio consists of 30%
invested in the risky market portfolio. For this perfectly informed manager, any timing portfolio
that involves shorting the market by more than 30% or investing more than 70% in the market
will hit the portfolio boundaries. Anticipating this and taking into account her e⁄ort disutility,
the manager will decide her optimal e⁄ort expenditure.
3In our model, the fund￿ s net asset value is given. We abstract from the implicit incentives arising from the
convex ￿ ow-performance relation documented in the literature (see, for instance, Gruber (1996), Sirri and Tufano
(1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Del Guercio and Tkac (2000) and Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro (2007)).
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consists of 20% in the market portfolio and 80% in the bond. The manager adjusts her optimal
portfolio. Relative to the benchmark, the unconditional optimal portfolio is still 30% long in
the market. Since the manager has to beat the market, her total market investment will be
now 50% of her portfolio: 20% to replicate the benchmark plus the optimal risk-diversi￿cation
30%. Holding the portfolio constraints constant, this implies that if the market premium is
predicted to be negative, the manager￿ s timing portfolio can now go short up to 50% in the
market, 20% more than in the absence of the benchmark. This will increase the manager￿ s
utility from e⁄ort, thereby improving the incentives for sharpening her timing ability. At the
same time, if the market premium is predicted to be positive, the manager￿ s timing portfolio
can go long in the market only 50%, 20% less than before the benchmark was introduced.
This has the opposite e⁄ect on the e⁄ort inducement: the manager will have less incentives to
exert costly e⁄ort. Taking into account this trade-o⁄, the benchmark is chosen such that the
manager￿ s unconditional portfolio (benchmark replication plus optimal risk-return trade-o⁄) is
equally distant from both portfolio boundaries. Such a benchmark would provide the manager
with the highest incentives for e⁄ort exertion. The intuition is simple: such a benchmark leaves
the manager marginally indi⁄erent between hitting the short-selling or the margin purchase
constraint. When the portfolio space is unconstrained, so is the timing portfolio. Benchmarking
the manager￿ s incentive fee does not alleviate the failure of these mechanisms to provide better
incentives for e⁄ort expenditure.
The benchmark composition is decided by the investor. The model shows that, in the absence
of moral hazard between the investor and the manager, the highest-e⁄ort inducement benchmark
is optimal for the investor. In the presence of moral hazard (i.e., when the manager￿ s e⁄ort is
not observable) numerical exercises show that the investor￿ s optimal benchmark is less risky
than the benchmark in the public information case although di⁄erent from the risk-free asset.
The model has readily testable empirical implications and, in this regard, our paper is related
to the literature on mutual fund performance evaluation. Golec (1992) and Elton, Gruber and
Blake (2003) document that the number of mutual funds that explicitly use incentive fees is
relatively small in comparison with the pervasive use of a ￿￿ at￿fee (a ￿xed percentage of the
fund￿ s net asset value).4 Further, Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003) ￿nd that funds which use
incentive fees have superior performance relative to those that do not. In their conclusions, they
claim that ￿while at this time funds with incentive fees seem to o⁄er superior performance relative
to other actively managed funds, we don￿ t know whether this is true because of the motivation
supplied by incentive fees or because skilled managers adopt incentive fees to advertise their
skills to the public.￿Our model shows that under portfolio constraints, portfolio managers who
are o⁄ered a benchmarked incentive fee are more motivated than equally skilled managers whose
compensation is not performance-linked.
In a related paper, Becker et al. (1999) test for market timing ability and benchmarking.
However, in their empirical model, the manager faces no portfolio constraints. According to our
4Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2006) ￿nd that even for hedge funds, the call-option-like incentive fee contract
provides incentives to deliver superior performance. In particular, they ￿nd that funds with higher delta have
better future performance.
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no support for the use of benchmarks in an unconditional setting. However, after conditioning
for public information, they ￿nd an economic meaningful estimate for benchmarking, albeit the
overall performance of the model remains quite poor. The empirical implications of our model
o⁄er guidance on how to extend the tests in Becker et al. (1999) into a framework that accounts
explicitly for the presence of short selling and margin purchase constraints, prevalent across the
mutual fund industry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next we introduce the model. The standard
unconstrained results are refreshed in Section 2.1. The e⁄ect of portfolio constraints are analyzed
in section 2.2. In section 3, we derive the composition of the e⁄ort-maximizing benchmark
portfolio. Section 4 studies the principal￿ s problem. A numerical solution to the constrained
manager￿ s e⁄ort is presented in Section 5. The paper concludes with Section 6. All proofs are
presented in the Appendix. Tables and ￿gures are to be found after the Appendix.
2 The model
A typical fund will inform the customer that managers (who are involved in investment research)
are responsible for choosing each fund￿ s investments. Customers may also be informed about
how the managers are compensated. Given the information, the customer decides how much to
invest in the fund. In this paper, we shall abstract from the decision problem of the consumer.
Instead, assuming that the interests of the customer and the fund owner are the same, we shall
focus on the determination of the manager￿ s compensation scheme by the owner of the fund.
Slightly abusing terminology, we call the owner of the ￿rm - the investor.
The manager and the investor have preferences represented by exponential utility functions:
Ua(W) = ￿exp(￿aW) and Ub(W) = ￿exp(￿bW), respectively. Throughout the paper we
will use a > 0 (b > 0) to denote the manager (investor) as well as her (his) absolute risk
aversion coe¢ cient. The investment opportunity set consists of two assets. A risk-free asset
with gross return R and a stock with stochastic excess return x normally distributed with mean
excess return ￿ > 0 and volatility ￿. These two assets can be interpreted as the usual ￿timing
portfolios￿for the active manager: the bond and the market portfolio (or any other stochastic
timing portfolio).
The investment horizon is one period. Payo⁄s are expressed in units of the economy￿ s only
consumption good. All consumption takes place in period-end. The manager￿ s compensation is
set as a percentage of the fund￿ s average net asset value over the period, W. The percentage
has two components: a ￿xed basic fee F and an incentive (performance-tied) fee. The incentive
fee is calculated as a percentage ￿ 2 (0;1] of the fund￿ s end of the period return, possibly net of
a benchmark return.5
5In Fidelity Small, Mid and Large Cap Stock Funds, for instance, the basic fee for Small Cap Stock, Mid-Cap
Stock and Large Cap Stock for the ￿scal year ended April 30, 2004 was 0.73%, 0.58%, and 0.58%, respectively,
of the fund￿ s average net assets. The performance adjustment rate is calculated monthly by comparing the
performance of Small Cap Stock￿ s relative to that of the Russell 2000, Mid-Cap Stock￿ s performance relative to
that of the S&P MidCap 400, or Large Cap Stock￿ s performance relative to that of the S&P 500. The performance
period is the most recent 36-month period. The maximum annualized performance adjustment rate is ￿0:20% of
the fund￿ s average net assets over the performance period. The performance adjustment rate is divided by twelve
4
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manager gets her reservation value. If she accepts the contract, then she puts some (unobserv-
able) e⁄ort e > 0 in acquiring private information (not observed by the fund￿ s investor) that
comes in the form of a signal





partially correlated with the stock￿ s excess return. The noise term has a standard normal
distribution ￿ ￿ N(0;1). For simplicity, we assume
Assumption (S1) E(x￿) = 0.
The higher the e⁄ort the more precise the manager￿ s timing information. Conditional on
the manager￿ s e⁄ort, the stock￿ s excess return is normally distributed with conditional mean
return E(xjy) =
￿+ey
1+e and conditional precision Var￿1(xjy) = 1
￿2(1 + e). Hence, e can also
be interpreted as the percentage (net) increase in precision induced by the manager￿ s private
information. Notice that, in case e = 0, the conditional and unconditional distributions coincide:
there is no relevant private information.
E⁄ort is costly. The monetary cost of e⁄ort disutility is a percentage V (D;e) of the fund￿ s
net asset value W. D > 0 represents a disutility parameter. The function V is increasing in D
and homogenous of degree one with respect to D. Moreover, for all e > 0, V satis￿es:6
Assumption (S2) V (D;0) = Ve(D;0) = V (0;e) = 0;





2.1 Unconstrained Portfolio Choice
Based on the conditional moments, the manager makes her optimal portfolio decision: she will
invest a percentage ￿(y) in the stock and the remaining 1￿￿(y) in the risk-free bond. Therefore,
the portfolio￿ s return will be Rp = R + ￿x. De￿ne the benchmark￿ s return as Rh = R + hx
with h as the benchmark￿ s policy weight: the proportion in the benchmark portfolio invested
in the risky stock. The portfolio￿ s net return is given by Rp ￿ Rh = ￿ ￿x with ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ h, the
net (over the benchmark) investment in the risky stock. If h = 0, the benchmarked return is
Rp ￿ Rh = ￿x, the excess return. Since the risk-free return is a constant, from the point of
view of the manager, this case is equivalent to no benchmarking. Given a contract (F;￿;h), the
conditional end-of-the-period wealth is given as a percentage ’a, for the manager, and ’b, for
the investor, of the fund￿ s net asset value, W:
’a(￿ ￿) = F + ￿￿ ￿x; (1)
’b(￿ ￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿x ￿ F; (2)
and multiplied by the fund￿ s average net assets over the performance period, and the resulting dollar amount is
then added to or subtracted from the basic fee. For alternative fee structures in the mutual fund industry, see
Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003).
6The subscripts e and ee denote, respectively, ￿rst and second derivative with respect to e⁄ort.
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2￿2, respectively. Thus, a￿W (b(1 ￿ ￿)W) represents
the manager￿ s (investor￿ s) relative risk aversion coe¢ cient. For simplicity, and without loss
of generality, we normalize W = 1.
We shall proceed backwards. First, we will obtain the optimal portfolio choice ￿. Then, after
recovering the manager￿ s indirect utility function, we will tackle the manager￿ s e⁄ort decision.
The unconstrained manager￿ s optimal net portfolio solves
￿ ￿(y) = argmax
￿ ￿
￿
E(’a(￿ ￿)) ￿ (a=2)Var(’a(￿ ￿))
￿
;
which yields the optimal portfolio





The manager￿ s optimal portfolio has three components: the benchmark￿ s investment in the
risky stock, h; the unconditional optimal risk-return trade-o⁄,
￿
a￿￿2 and, depending on the
manager￿ s signal y and her e⁄ort expenditure, e, the timing portfolio,
ey
a￿￿2.
Replacing ￿(y) in the manager￿ s expected utility function and integrating over the signal y
we obtain the manager￿ s (unconditional) expected utility:












We call this solution the second best e⁄ort.8 Assumptions (S2) and (S3) guarantee that the
necessary condition (5) is also su¢ cient for optimality. Clearly, the manager￿ s second best
e⁄ort choice (hence the quality of her private information) is independent of the benchmark￿ s
composition, h. This is the same result as in Admati and P￿ eiderer (1997). E⁄ort only depends
on the manager￿ s disutility coe¢ cient, D.
7Notice that, since V is homogenous of degree one with respect to D, we can always write aV (D
0;e) = V (D;e)
with D = aD
0. Hence the parameter D is a (increasing) function of the manager￿ s risk aversion among other
factors.
8The ￿rst best e⁄ort is the e⁄ort the unconstrained manager would exert under no asymmetric information,
that is, in the absence of moral hazard.
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We now introduce the main theoretical contribution of the paper. Assume that the manager
is constrained in her portfolio choice in that she cannot short-sell or purchase on margin. Let
m ￿ 1 denote the maximum trade on margin the manager is allowed: m = 1 means that the
manager is not allowed to purchase the risky stock on margin; for any m > 1 the manager can
borrow and invest in the risky stock up to m ￿ 1 dollars per dollar of the fund￿ s current net
asset value. Let s ￿ 0 denote the short-selling limit: s = 0 means that the manager cannot
sell short the risky stock; for any s > 0 the manager can short up to s dollars per dollar of the
fund￿ s current net asset value. According to the SEC regulation, the maximum initial margin
for leveraged positions is 50%, which implies that m ￿ 2 and s ￿ 1.9 In terms of the manager￿ s
portfolio choice problem, this implies m ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿s or, equivalently, m ￿ h ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(h + s).
The manager then solves the following constrained problem
￿ ￿(y) = arg max
m￿h￿￿ ￿￿￿(h+s)
￿
E(’a(￿ ￿)) ￿ (a=2)Var(’a(￿ ￿))
￿
:
Call ￿m ￿ 0 and ￿s ￿ 0 the corresponding Lagrange multipliers, such that ￿m(m ￿ h ￿ ￿ ￿) =
￿s(￿ ￿ +h+s) = 0. There are three solutions. If neither constraint is binding, ￿m = ￿s = 0, then
the interior solution follows: ￿ ￿(y) =
￿+ey
a￿￿2. Alternatively, there are two possible corner solutions:
￿rst, if the short-selling limit is binding, ￿m = 0 and ￿s = E(xjy) + a￿(h + s)Var(xjy) < 0. In
such a case, ￿ ￿ = ￿(h + s). In the second corner solution, the margin purchase bound is hit:
￿s = 0 and ￿m = ￿E(xjy) + a￿(m ￿ h)Var(xjy) < 0. In such a case, ￿ ￿ = m ￿ h.
Solving for the optimal portfolio ￿(y) as a function of the signal realization we obtain that,








￿ h ￿ m ￿
￿
a￿￿2.
For the case when e > 0 we obtain:
￿(y) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :






















the leverage ratios. These ratios represent the net (relative to the benchmark) maximum leverage
from selling short (h+s) or trading at margin (m￿h) as a proportion of the manager￿ s optimal
unconstrained portfolio when e = 0 and h = 0.








￿￿1 < 0. That is, Ls (Lm) increases (decreases) with h.
9Of course, investors can e⁄ectively leverage their portfolios above those limits by investing in derivatives.
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increases (decreases) with the manager￿ s relative risk aversion a￿.
Equation (6) shows how the constraints and benchmarking interact to provide incentives for
e⁄ort expenditure. To see the intuition, let us focus ￿rst on the short-selling constraint. Let us
assume for the moment that there exist no limit to margin purchases (m ! 1) and that no
short position can be taken (s = 0). Under these assumptions, and after putting some e⁄ort e,











with Ls = 1 + h
￿ ￿
a￿￿2
￿￿1. When h = 0, all signals y < ￿
￿
e lead to short-selling. Imagine now
that the manager is o⁄ered a benchmarked contract, with h > 0 the benchmark￿ s proportion
invested in the risky stock. In this case, the short-selling bound is only hit for smaller signals
y < ￿
￿
eLs. In general, increasing h leads to a ￿wider range￿of implementable signals relative
to the case of no benchmarking (h = 0). Since the e⁄ort decision is taken prior to the signal
realization, the fact that more signals are implementable under benchmarking (h > 0) increases
the marginal expected utility of e⁄ort. The size of this incremental area grows with ha￿. Hence,
we expect the impact of benchmarking to be relatively higher for more risk averse investors.
Alternatively, assume there is no benchmarking (h = 0) but the short-selling limit is ex-
panded from s = 0 to s = h. Figure 1 shows that, ceteris paribus, the e⁄ort choice of the
manager will coincide with the e⁄ort put under benchmarking: given that s = 0, benchmarking
the manager￿ s portfolio return (h > 0) is, in terms of e⁄ort inducement, equivalent to relaxing
the short-selling bound from 0 to h. In other words, in the absence of margin purchase con-
straints, the manager￿ s e⁄ort depends on s + h; benchmarking the manager￿ s performance and
relaxing her short-selling constraints are perfect substitutes for e⁄ort inducement. The higher s
the lower the marginal expected utility of e⁄ort induced by benchmarking. In the limit, when
the short-selling bounds vanish (s ! 1), we converge to the unconstrained scenario in Section
2.1 where benchmarking was shown to be irrelevant for the manager￿ s e⁄ort decision.
Let us focus now on the margin purchase constraint. Assume s ! 1 and m = 1. This
implies that the manager can short any amount but cannot trade on margin: for ￿very good￿
signals the manager can only invest up to 100% of the fund￿ s net asset value in the risky stock.











with Lm = (1 ￿ h)
￿ ￿
a￿￿2
￿￿1 ￿ 1. Lm is decreasing in h. Decreasing h in the manager￿ s com-
pensation just makes the portfolio constraint ￿less binding,￿i.e., binding for bigger signals. For
instance, moving from a benchmarked contract (h > 0) to a non benchmarked contract (h = 0)
would increase the manager￿ s e⁄ort: signals that were not implementable under benchmark-
8
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on e⁄ort expenditure would be analogous if benchmarking were not removed (h > 0) and the
constraint on margin purchases made looser: from m = 1 to m = 1 + h. Therefore, in the
absence of short selling constraints, the manager￿ s e⁄ort depends on m ￿ h: benchmarking the
manager and tightening the margin purchase constraint are perfect substitutes for the manager￿ s
e⁄ort (dis)incentive. Again, the impact of benchmarking increases, in absolute terms, with the
manager￿ s relative risk aversion, a￿. In the limit, when the manager faces no margin purchase
constraint (m ! 1) the benchmark composition is irrelevant for the manager￿ s e⁄ort decision.
In summary, by modifying the benchmark portfolio composition we observe two opposing
e⁄ects: for the short selling constrained manager, increasing the benchmark￿ s percentage invested
in the risky stock (h) induces the manager to put more e⁄ort. On the other side, for the manager
constrained in her ability to purchases at margin, increasing that percentage lowers the e⁄ort
incentives. Thus, when (as for most mutual fund managers) both short selling and margin
purchase are constrained, the trade-o⁄ between these two e⁄ects yields the optimal benchmark
composition. This is the question we investigate in the next section.
3 The optimal benchmark portfolio composition
To address this question, we proceed as follows. Proposition 1 introduces the manager￿ s uncon-
ditional expected utility under short selling (0 ￿ s < 1) and margin purchase (1 ￿ m < 1)
constraints for all possible values of h in the real line. In Proposition 2 we show that Assumptions
(S2)-(S4) are su¢ cient for the existence of a continuous and di⁄erentiable e⁄ort function, e(h),
that yields a unique e⁄ort choice for each value of h. The function attains a global maximum




Before introducing the constrained manager￿ s unconditional expected utility we need some
notation. Let ￿(￿) denote the cumulative probability function of a Chi-square variable with one






2￿ z￿1=2 exp(￿z=2) when z > 0;
0 otherwise.
Proposition 1 Given the ￿nite portfolio constraints s ￿ 0 and m ￿ 1, the risk-averse man-


















































































































































































if h > m ￿
￿
a￿￿2:
Equations (7), (8) and (9) are weighted sums of the manager￿ s unconstrained expected utility
(4), independent of h, and her expected utility function when the portfolio hits either the short-

















the manager is constrained, the benchmark￿ s composition (i.e., the value of the parameter h)
a⁄ects the quality of the timing signal through the e⁄ort choice.









































































if h > m ￿
￿
a￿￿2;
is decreasing with respect to e.








a￿￿2]. To see this, let ￿ represent
the deviation in the benchmark portfolio￿ s percentage invested in the risky asset above (￿ > 0)
or below (￿ < 0) the reference value h￿. It can be shown that Ls(h￿ + ￿) = Lm(h￿ ￿ ￿) for all
￿ 2 <. Replacing the later equality in the functions g and ge the symmetry is proved.
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function in Proposition 1:
eTB = argmaxe ￿(1=2)exp(￿(1=2)￿2=￿2 ￿ aF + V (D;e)) ￿ g(e;Ls;Lm): (10)
From the previous equation, it is obvious that, unlike in the unconstrained scenario, the
manager￿ s optimal e⁄ort depends on h (through Ls and Lm). We want to study how the third
best e⁄ort changes with h, more concretely, whether there exists an optimal (e⁄ort maximizing)
benchmark.
The following proposition presents general conditions on the e⁄ort disutility function and
the range of the benchmark parameter h for which there exists a well behaved e⁄ort function,
that is, a function that yields, for each benchmark portfolio h, the utility maximizing third best
e⁄ort (10). More importantly, the same conditions are shown to be su¢ cient for the existence
of a benchmark portfolio h￿ that elicits the highest e⁄ort from the manager. The value of h￿
is explicitly derived as a function of the manager￿ s portfolio constraints on short selling, s, and
margin purchase, m; her relative risk aversion, a￿; and the market portfolio moments, ￿ and
￿2.




a￿￿2] there exists a unique









Corollary 2 Assume (S2)-(S4) hold. Provided it exists, the e⁄ort function e(h) is increasing
in h for all h < ￿(s +
￿
a￿￿2) and decreasing in h for all h > m ￿
￿
a￿￿2. Moreover, the e⁄ort
function is symmetric in h around h￿, i.e., e(h￿ + ￿) = e(h￿ ￿ ￿) for all ￿ 2 <.
From proposition 2 and corollary 2, it is clear that the manager￿ s e⁄ort function attains
a global maximum at h￿ = m￿s
2 ￿
￿
a￿￿2. The intuition for this result is as follows: on the
one hand, increasing benchmarking (i.e., higher h) lowers the likelihood of hitting the short
selling constraint; on the other hand, it increases the probability of hitting the margin purchase
constraint. The e⁄ect of decreasing benchmarking (i.e. lower h) is just symmetric. The trade-o⁄
of these two opposite e⁄ects yields the e⁄ort-maximizing value of the benchmark composition, h￿.
In other words, the benchmark portfolio h￿ makes the manager, in expected terms, indi⁄erent
between hitting either constraint (short selling and margin purchase).
Intuitively, the e⁄ort choice for the constrained manager is smaller than for the unconstrained
manager. In the next corollary we formalize this intuition.
Corollary 3 For any given contract (F;￿;h) and ￿nite manager￿ s risk aversion, a, the con-
strained manager￿ s third best e⁄ort eTB < eSB. Only in the limit, when the manager￿ s risk
aversion tends to in￿nity, it is optimal for the constrained manager to exert the unconstrained,
second best e⁄ort.
We conclude this section by studying to especial cases of the more general constrained prob-
lem. As illustrated in the examples in section 2.2, when the manager is only short selling con-
strained (i.e., unlimited margin purchases), increasing the benchmark investment in the risky
11
IE WORKING PAPER                         DF8-125-I                          19/03/2007asset, h, gives the manager more incentives to put higher e⁄ort. In the case of unlimited short
selling and constrained margin purchases, the result is symmetric: e⁄ort decreases with h. In
either case, there is no optimal benchmark composition. The following corollary summarizes
these ￿ndings.
Corollary 4 When the manager can purchase at margin with no limit but faces a short selling
bound, the e⁄ort function is monotonous increasing in h. Symmetrically, when the manager can
sell short with no restriction but faces limited margin purchase, the e⁄ort function is monotonous
decreasing with h.
4 The principal￿ s problem
The investor￿ s optimal contract (F;￿;h) maximizes his expected utility subject to the man-
ager￿ s incentive compatibility and participation constraints. For simplicity, and without loss of
generality, we normalize the manager￿ s reservation value to ￿exp(￿(1=2)￿2=￿2). For a given
contract (F;￿;h), the manager￿ s (conditional) wealth is given as a percentage, equation (2), of
the fund￿ s net asset value. G￿mez and Sharma (2006) have shown that when the manager is
unconstrained, the second best incentive fee is equal to the ￿rst best incentive fee, ￿SB = ￿FB.
The manager￿ s e⁄ort solves condition (5), independent of ￿ and h. Hence, absent any portfolio
constraint, the model bears no prediction about the benchmark parameter h.
The constrained manager, after accepting the contract, puts the third best e⁄ort eTB in (10).
Then, she receives the signal y and invest a proportion ￿(y) as in (6) in the risky asset.
Call t(￿) =
b(1￿￿)
a￿ the ratio of the investor￿ s vis-￿ a-vis the manager￿ s relative risk aversion.







h ￿ m ￿
￿
a￿￿2. The investor￿ s expected utility is introduced in the following proposition.






￿ h ￿ m￿
￿
a￿￿2. Given the portfolio constraints s ￿ 0 and
m ￿ 1, the expected utility of the risk-averse investor is EUb(’b(e)) = ￿exp(bF ￿(1=2)￿2=￿2)￿










































































The investor must chose the optimal linear contract, which includes the optimal ￿xed and
incentive fees, ￿ and h, respectively, and the optimal benchmark, h. We want to study how the
12
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Assume ￿rst that the manager￿ s e⁄ort decision is observable. In this case the investor
maximizes his expected utility with respect to ￿, h and e⁄ort subject to the participation
constraint ￿(1=2)exp(￿(1=2)￿2=￿2￿aF+V (a;e))￿g(e;Ls;Lm) ￿ ￿exp(￿(1=2)￿2=￿2): Clearly,
neither e⁄ort nor h are a function of F. This, along with the fact that the left-hand side is
increasing in F and the investor￿ s utility is decreasing in F, implies that under the optimal
contract the participation constraint is binding. So, the investor￿ s problem is reduced to ￿nding
the optimal split, benchmark, and e⁄ort that maximizes
EUb(’b(e)) = ￿exp(￿(1=2)￿2=￿2 + (b=a)V (D;e)) ￿ g(e;Ls;Lm)b=af(e;Ls;Lm): (12)
On the other hand, when the manager￿ s e⁄ort decision is not observable by the investor,
the third best problem consists in ￿nding the optimal split ￿TB that maximizes (12) subject to
the manager￿ s optimal e⁄ort condition (10). Note that, due to ￿rst order condition (A1) in the
Appendix, (10) is uniquely solvable in terms of ￿ and h.
Despite this simpli￿cation, it is di¢ cult to ￿nd a closed form solution for the optimal linear
contract. Yet, we can still show that under bounded leverage and in the absence of moral hazard:
(i) for h = h￿, the unconstrained, ￿rst best risk-share ￿FB = b
a+b is (￿rst-order condition)
optimal, consistent with the result in G￿mez and Sharma (2006); (ii) for ￿ = ￿FB, the benchmark
parameter h￿ in Proposition 2 is optimal.
In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal linear contract is, in general, di⁄erent from
(￿FB;h￿). The Appendix shows that, for ￿ = ￿FB, h￿ satis￿es the ￿rst-order optimality con-
dition. However, the marginal utility of the third best e⁄ort at ￿FB is positive. This is to be
expected because under portfolio constraints ￿ plays an additional role over risk-sharing. As
in most moral hazard problems, e¢ ciency in risk allocation has to be traded o⁄ against e⁄ort
inducement. In the limit, when the manager￿ s absolute risk aversion a ! 1, ￿FB ! 0 and the
contract (￿FB;h￿) becomes optimal.
Proposition 4 When the e⁄ort decision is public information, the contract (￿FB;h￿) is optimal
under portfolio constraints.
When the e⁄ort decision is not observable by the investor, the contract (￿FB;h￿) is, in
general, suboptimal. In the limit, when the manager￿ s absolute risk aversion a ! 1, the contract
(￿FB;h￿) becomes optimal.
The model, therefore, predicts that for a su¢ ciently risk averse manager, the optimal con-




b￿2 when ￿ = ￿FB and a ! 1. This ￿nding is consistent with the contracts
typically observed among mutual fund managers (arguably, more risk averse and certainly con-
strained): low incentive fee and relative (i.e., benchmarked) performance evaluation. In contrast,
unrestricted hedge fund managers are usually o⁄ered high incentive fees and their performance
is measured in absolute (i.e., non-benchmarked) terms.
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Due to the complexity of the manager￿ s expected utility function in Proposition 1, we cannot
solve analytically for the optimal third best contract. We can, however, solve the problem
numerically. We propose the function V (e) = D
2 e2 with disutility parameter D = 1.
Throughout the numerical analysis, we take the market excess return ￿ = 6% and the market
volatility ￿ = 18%, both on an annual basis. The principal￿ s absolute risk aversion is b =
10. The manager￿ s absolute risk aversion parameter takes values a 2 f10;20;30;40;100;1000g.
The manager is constrained as follows: s = 0 and m = 1. For each combination (a;b) we
calculate the investor￿ s expected utility for a grid of values for alpha and h around the contract
(￿FB(a;b);h￿(a;b)). The grid size is 13 ￿ 13. Precisely, ￿ changes from 70% ￿ ￿FB(a;b) to
130% ￿ ￿FB(a;b), at intervals of length 5%￿FB(a;b). Likewise, h changes from 70%h￿(a;b) to
130% ￿ h￿(a;b), at intervals of length 5%h￿(a;b).
We calculate the investor￿ s expected utility in two cases: ￿rst in the absence of moral hazard
(the manager￿ s e⁄ort decision is publicly observable); second under moral hazard, i.e., the third
best scenario. Figures 2 and 3 present the results graphically.
The left column presents the public information case. For each contract (￿;h) the investor
solves for the manager￿ s e⁄ort level that maximizes (12). Notice that, for al values of a, the
optimal contract (highest expected utility) is, as predicted by Proposition 4, (￿FB;h￿), right
at the center of the grid. Obviously, by de￿nition, holding b = 10 constant, ￿FB (h￿)decreases
(increases) with a.
The right column presents the third best scenario. For each contract (￿;h) the manager
chooses her optimal third best e⁄ort in (10). For all values of a the optimal contract under
moral hazard is located North-East relative to the optimal, public information benchmark (left
column). We observe that the optimal ￿ > ￿FB and the optimal benchmark h ￿ h￿. This con-
￿rms the prediction in Proposition 4: under moral hazard, the contract (￿FB;h￿) is suboptimal.
Notice that as a increases, the third best contract converges to the public information optimal
contract (￿FB;h￿), just as predicted by Proposition 4.
Figure 4 presents the induced third best e⁄ort under portfolio constraints for three values
of the manager￿ s risk aversion: a = f10;40;100g. The second best e⁄ort eSB = 0:366 is also
reported for comparison purposes. Notice that, in agreement with Proposition 2, for every given
￿ the third best e⁄ort is symmetric around h￿. Moreover, consistent with G￿mez and Sharma
(2006), for every benchmark portfolio h the third best e⁄ort increases monotonously with ￿.
As the manager￿ s risk aversion increases, the induced third best e⁄ort converges towards the
unconstrained second best e⁄ort.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the e⁄ort inducement incentives of (potentially benchmarked) linear
incentive fee contracts. Incentives arise explicitly via the compensation of the manager. The
investor has to decide simultaneously the incentive fee (the manager￿ s participation in the dele-
gated portfolio￿ s return) and the benchmark composition.
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the fact that we incorporate portfolio constraints in our model. These constraints are exogenous
in our model and could be motivated by regulation or, as suggested by Almazan et al (2004), as
alternative monitoring mechanism in a broader equilibrium model.
Under portfolio constraints and moral hazard, our model predicts that portfolio manager￿ s
should be o⁄ered an incentive fee benchmarked against a portfolio that combines the risky
market portfolio and the risky asset. Numerical exercises suggest that, in contrast with the pre-
dictions from the unconstrained setting in Ou-Yang (2003), the risk-free asset is not the optimal
benchmark. When portfolio constraints are removed, the model predicts that the manager￿ s
e⁄ort is unrelated to the incentive fee and the benchmark composition, a well-known result in
the literature.
These predictions are consistent with the prevalence of absolute return (non-benchmarked)
compensation schemes among hedge fund managers, arguably much less constrained than mutual
fund managers. Moreover, it o⁄ers a theoretical foundation for the observed out-performance of
mutual funds who o⁄er incentive fee compensation as documented by Elton, Gruber and Blake
(2003). Novel empirical implications of our model will be the object of further research in the
future.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Replacing (6) in the manager￿ s utility function:
EU (’a(y)) = ￿exp(￿aF + V (D;e)) ￿
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
exp
￿
(h + s)a￿E(xjy) + (1=2)((h + s)a￿)2Var(xjy)
￿















Multiplying the previous expression by the density function of the signal variable, y, we
obtain:









> > > > > > > > > > <






















































￿2 if y < ￿
￿












￿2 otherwise. Integrating over k and given the de￿nition of ￿(￿), the unconditional
utility function follows. QED
Proof of Corollary 1















































Proof of Proposition 2
Let us de￿ne J(e;Ls;Lm) = Ve(D;e)￿g(e;Ls;Lm)+ge(e;Ls;Lm): The function J 2 C1 for all
(e;h). The third best e⁄ort in (10) satis￿es:
18
IE WORKING PAPER                         DF8-125-I                          19/03/2007J(eTB;Ls;Lm) = 0; (A1)
Je(eTB;Ls;Lm) > 0: (A2)
The implicit function theorem allows us to solve ￿locally￿the equation; that is, for all (^ e;^ h)
that satisfy (A1) and (A2), e⁄ort e can be expressed as a function of h in a neighborhood of
(^ e;^ h).
More formally: for all (^ e;^ h) that satisfy (A1) and (A2) there exists a function e(h) 2 C1 and
an open ball B(^ h), such that e(^ h) = eTB and J(e(h);Ls;Lm) = 0 for all h 2 B(^ h).
Taking the derivative of J(eTB;Ls;Lm) with respect to h:10
eh(h) = ￿Jh(eTB;Ls;Lm) ￿ J ￿1
e (eTB;Ls;Lm):









































































The sign of eh(h), therefore, depends on the sign of Jh(e;Ls;Lm) = Ve(D;e)￿gh(e;Ls;Lm)+
geh(e;Ls;Lm).



























for all h 2 <.
Let us de￿ne the gamma function ￿(u) =
R 1
0 tu￿1exp(￿t)dt for u > 0. The incomplete
gamma function is given by ￿(u;v) =
R 1






















































10The subscript h denotes ￿rst derivative with respect to h. The subscript eh denotes cross derivative with
respect to e and h.
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2 , Ls(h￿ ￿ ￿) <
Lm(h￿￿￿) and Ls(h￿+￿) > Lm(h￿+￿). Let L￿
s = Ls(h￿) and L￿
m = Lm(h￿). For ￿ = 0, L￿
s = L￿
m.






￿ h < h￿ and eh(h) < 0 for all h￿ < h ￿ m ￿
￿
a￿￿2;
eh(h￿) = 0. Since the function e(h) is continuous and di⁄erentiable, it follows that h￿ is a local













Proof of Corollary 2





































































Let h > m ￿
￿





































































































































































This implies that EeUa(’a(eSB)) = ￿exp(￿(1=2)￿2=￿2￿aF+V (D;eSB))￿J(eSB;Ls;Lm) <
0:
Therefore, for the constrained manager, the marginal utility of e⁄ort at eSB is negative. Since
eTB is unique and the function is continuous in e, given conditions (A1) and (A2), it follows












. Given Corollary 2 this result holds for all



























Therefore, given (A6) and (A7), J(eSB;Ls;Lm) tends to zero when a tends to in￿nity. In
the limit, the constrained manager￿ s marginal expected utility of e⁄ort becomes zero at eSB,
EeUa(’a(eSB)) = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 4
Lemma 1 For all 0 < x < 1, 1
2 (1 ￿ ￿(x)) ￿ ￿(x) < 0.
Proof: See Lemma 1 in G￿mez and Sharma (2006)
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< 0; given Lemma 1.
Therefore, gh(e;Ls) < 0 for all h 2 <. From (A3), geh(e;Ls) < 0 for all h 2 <. Thus,
eh(h) > 0 for all h 2 <. Following the same procedure, it is trivial to show that eh(h) < 0 for
all h 2 < when s ! 1 and 1 ￿ m < 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
First, we prove the results under the assumption of public information.























￿￿1. From Lemma 2 in G￿mez and




























From (A4) if follows that gh(e;L￿
s;L￿





m) = 0. Q.E.D.
Therefore, in the absence of moral hazard, the investor chooses the manager￿ s e⁄ort level
that maximizes EUb(’b(e)j￿FB;h￿) = ￿exp
￿







Under moral hazard, the third best e⁄ort, eTB, is a function of ￿ and h. The ￿rst order













for i = f￿;hg: Given Lemma 2, @











m) ￿ J ￿1
e (eTB;L￿
s;L￿
m) > 0 for all ￿ 2 (0;1] and a < 1.
From Proposition 2, @
@h eTB(￿FB;h)jh=h￿ = 0. Hence, in general, the contract (￿FB;h￿) is
suboptimal.
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s;L￿






















, both independent of ￿. Therefore, lima!1
@
@￿eTB(￿;h￿) = 0 for all ￿ 2 (0;1]. In
the limit, the contract (￿FB;h￿) becomes (￿rst-order) optimal. Q.E.D.
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IE WORKING PAPER                         DF8-125-I                          19/03/2007Figure 1: We assume that short-selling is totally forbidden (s = 0) and there is no limit to margin
purchase (m ! 1). For simplicity, let ￿ = 1. After putting e⁄ort e the manager receives a signal
y and makes her optimal portfolio ￿. When h = 0 (bottom portfolio line), all signals y < ￿
￿
e
lead to short-selling. When h > 0 (upper portfolio line), the short-selling bound is hit for signals
y < ￿
￿
eLs: In both cases, the region of these non-implementable portfolios is marked by the
thick line. Under benchmarking (h > 0) there is an incremental area for implementable signals
relative to the case of no benchmarking. The size of this area, ha
e=￿2; increases with benchmarking
(h) and the manager￿ s risk aversion (a); it has probability mass equal to the shaded area in the
density function plot.
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IE WORKING PAPER                         DF8-125-I                          19/03/2007Figure 2: The left column presents the public information case. For each contract (￿;h) the
investor solves for the manager￿ s e⁄ort level that maximizes (12). Notice that, for al values of a,
the optimal contract (highest expected utility) is, as predicted by Proposition 4, (￿FB;h￿), right
at the center of the grid. Obviously, by de￿nition, holding b = 10 constant, ￿FB (h￿)decreases
(increases) with a
25
IE WORKING PAPER                         DF8-125-I                          19/03/2007Figure 3: The right column presents the third best scenario. For each contract (￿;h) the
manager chooses her optimal third best e⁄ort in (10). For all values of a the optimal contract
under moral hazard is located North-East relative to the optimal, public information benchmark
(left column). In concrete we observe that the optimal ￿ > ￿FB and the optimal benchmark
h ￿ h￿. This con￿rms the prediction in Proposition 4: under moral hazard, the contract
(￿FB;h￿) is suboptimal. Notice that as a increases, the third best contract converges to the
public information optimal contract (￿FB;h￿), just as predicted by Proposition 4.
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IE WORKING PAPER                         DF8-125-I                          19/03/2007Figure 4: Induced third best e⁄ort under portfolio constraints for three values of the manager￿ s
risk aversion: a = f10;40;100g. The optimal contracts (￿;h) are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The
manager￿ s risk aversion is b = 10. The e⁄ort disutility parameter is D = 1. The second best
e⁄ort eSB = 0:366 is also reported for comparison purposes.
27
IE WORKING PAPER                         DF8-125-I                          19/03/2007NOTAS NOTAS  
D
e
p
ó
s
i
t
o
 
L
e
g
a
l
:
 
M
-
2
0
0
7
3
 
 
 
I
.
S
.
S
.
N
.
:
 
1
5
7
9
-
4
8
7
3
 
NOTAS 